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Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control 
             Mitsuru KUROSAWA*
  Effort to prevent he spread of nuclear weapons has been made since the 1960s 
through technical non-proliferation means as well as through political non-
proliferation undertakings. The importance of the technical means comes from the 
fact that not all states have acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
and even if a state is a party to the NPT, the state may suspiciously be in the 
process of the development of nuclear weapons. In this article, I will mainly 
examine the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related 
technologies through technical means. 
  First, I will consider the current efforts to prevent he spread of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear-related technologies by categorizing them into three measures, that is, 
political, technical and military measures. This is the analysis of the current 
situation. 
  Second, I will examine the measures that have been taken to prevent nuclear-
related technology by dividing them into two, that is, the measures taken with a 
prior political agreement and measures taken without a prior political agreement. I 
will make the contents and characteristics of both measures clear. 
  Third, I will take up the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger 
Committee that were established to prevent the spread of nuclear-related 
technologies. I will critically analyze these systems from the viewpoint of their 
effectiveness and legitimacy by examining the measures taken by the two export 
control systems and the arguments on them. 
  Finally, I will argue for the necessity of a demand-side approach as well as a 
supply-side approach. I also argue for the necessity to link the non-proliferation 
issue to nuclear disarmament issue, because the spread of technology is inevitable 
and we can not take effective countermeasures through technical measures only or 
through the measures by the NSG only.
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I. Typology of Non-Proliferation Measures
  Nuclear non-proliferation regime, consisting of several measures including the 
NPT at its center, is playing a very important role in the current international 
society. The nuclear non-proliferation regime plays an indispensable role in 
maintaining international peace and stability, although it has some discriminatory 
nature in it. Several measures have been taken to prevent and counter proliferation 
and these measures can be categorized into political, technical and military 
measures. 1)
1. Political Measures 
  The central measure among political measures is making a treaty, but there are 
other political measures. 
  a) Treaty 
  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 and entered 
into force in 1970. The number of the parties to the NPT is now 187, among which 
182 states are non-nuclear-weapon states. Through the Treaty non-nuclear-weapon 
states undertake the legal obligation not to produce or possess nuclear weapons. 
The NPT is the measure for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons through the 
political will of each party to the Treaty, even though nuclear-related technology 
has been widely spreading. 
  The treaty as a political measure must be examined from the viewpoint of 
universality and effectiveness. The problem of universality is that there exist some 
states that want to stay outside of a treaty. India, Israel and Pakistan are not parties 
to the NPT. The problem of effectiveness i  that a party to the treaty may develop 
or produce nuclear weapons although it is under legal obligation not to do so. Iraq 
and North Korea fall under this category. In order to secure its compliance, the 
NPT provides for the acceptance by non-nuclear-weapon states of IAEA full-scope 
safeguards.
1) Roberts analyzes export control, arms control and counterproliferation as the components of 
   nonproliferation regime, and concludes that "a major lesson that has emerged over the last decade is that 
  these tools of policy not only complement one another but that their integrated pursuit is essential to 
  their combined success" (Brad Roberts, "Proliferation and Nonproliferation i the 1990s: Looking for 
   the Right Lessons," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.6, No.4, Fall 1999, p.74). Mitchell arguesthat 
   not only carrots and sticks, but also six strategies-deterrent, remunerative, preventive, generative and 
   normative-are necessary as strategies for nuclear nonproliferation. (Ronald B. Mitchell, "International 
   Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Beyond Carrots and Sticks," The NonproliferationReview, Vol.5, 
   No.1, Fall 1997, pp.40-52.)
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  Treaties establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which prohibit not only 
producing or possessing nuclear weapons but also permitting the deployment of 
nuclear weapons, play a role supplementary to the NPT. A nuclear-weapon-free 
zone has been established in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and 
Africa, on the initiative of each region. 
  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has a purpose to stop nuclear 
testing by the five nuclear-weapon states. However, in essence, its main purpose is 
to prevent India, Israel and Pakistan from conducting nuclear test, complementing 
the lack of the universality of the NPT.2) 
  b) Other Measures 
  As political measures other than making a treaty, we can witness cooperative 
measures after the end of the Cold War. Cooperative measures mean that when 
there is a danger of nuclear proliferation, states undertake to politically cooperate in 
order to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
  One is the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The United States 
initiated it in 1992 in order to strengthen the control and accounting of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It also helps Russia in dismantling strategic nuclear weapons 
according to the START I Treaty. 3) 
  The other is the establishment and activities of Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO). It was agreed in the Agreed Framework of 
October 1994 between the United States and North Korea. Its main job is to build 
two light water reactors in North Korea.
2. Technical Measures 
  In order toprevent he spread of nuclear weapons, measures uch as prohibiting 
the transfer of nuclear-related items or technology, or subjecting their transfer to the
2) This idea is implied in the provision of its entry into force. For the CTBT to enter into force, all 44 
   states designated including India, Pakistan and Israel as well as five nuclear-weapon states have to ratify 
   the Treaty. 
3) On the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, see Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard A. 
   Falkenrath, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, The MIT Press, 1996; Jason Ellis, "Nunn-Lugar's Mid-Life 
   Crisis," Survival, Vol.39, No.1, Spring 1997, pp.84-110; Jessica E. Stem, "U.S. AssistancePrograms 
   for Improving MPC&A in the Former Soviet Union," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.3, No.2, Winter 
   1996, pp. 17-45; Kenneth Luongo, "The Uncertain Future of U.S.-Russia Cooperative Nuclear Security," 
   Arms Control Today, Vol.31, No.1, January/February 2000, pp.3-10; Joseph R. Biden, Jr., "Maintaining 
   the Proliferation Fight in the Former Soviet Union," Arms Control Today, Vol.29, No.2, March 1999, 
   pp.20-25.
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condition of applying IAEA safeguards on the items have been undertaken. These 
efforts are to combat nuclear proliferation from a technical aspect. The NPT 
demands the application of the IAEA full-scope safeguards to all non-nuclear-
weapon state parties. 
  When a party to the NPT wants to export nuclear-related items to a non-party 
non-nuclear-weapon state, the IAEA safeguards have to be applied under the 
Treaty, but it is not full-scope safeguards but safeguards applied only to exported 
items. In order to implement his provision, the Zangger Committee consisting of 
exporting countries of nuclear-related items was established. 
  A central measure from a technical aspect is an export control conducted by the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Several supplier states have made up a group, the 
group has agreed common guidelines, and each member state implements them 
individually through national egislation or practices. The Guidelines for Nuclear 
Transfer consists of fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls as 
well as trigger lists, clarification of items and level of physical protection in 
Annexes.
3. Military Measures 
  There are some measures to use or threat to use military powers in order to 
prevent proliferation or reverse the situation of proliferation. 
  One is a policy of counterproliferation thathas been emphasized by the United 
States since 1993. This measure aims to reverse the situation where proliferation 
has already occurred, and has been taken place in strong connection with U.S. 
weapon procurement. The offensive aspect of the counterproliferation i cludes the 
development and production of bunker busters in order to penetrate into deep earth 
to destroy targets in deep underground. The defensive aspect of the 
counterproliferation i cludes theater missile defense (TMD) at the beginning and 
national missile defense (NMD) later. 
  The other military measure has been taken in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) after the end of so-called Gulf War. As it 
was not clear that Iraq had developed nuclear weapons at that time, the resolution 
demanded Iraq to declare nuclear-weapon usable materials and asked the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to control and destroy them. Later it 
became clear through on-site inspections by the UNSCOM and the IAEA that Iraq 
had developed nuclear weapons. As a result, they were given the authority to 
destroy all nuclear-related facilities and materials in Iraq. All nuclear-related 
facilities and materials were reportedly destroyed by military measures. 4)
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II. Efforts to 
   Technology
Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapon Development
1. Measures based on a political agreement 
  a) IAEA Safeguards (Article111.1 of the NPT) 
  According to the Article III, paragraph 1 of the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon 
state party to the Treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards to prevent diversion 
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. The safeguards hall be applied to all source and special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities of the state. 
  In order to implement he safeguards, each state has to conclude a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA. A model safeguards agreement was elaborated in 
1971.5) Here safeguards apply to all nuclear material in a non-nuclear-weapon 
state party to the Treaty. Full-scope safeguards shall apply here. 
  Clandestine nuclear weapon program by Iraq was revealed by on-site 
inspections by the UNSCOM and the IAEA based on the UN Security Council 
resolution 687 (1991). Iraq has been a party to the NPT since 1971, the IAEA 
safeguards have been applied since, and the IAEA has reported every year that 
there is no discrepancy. The IAEA inspection is conducted based on the 
declaration of a state. Iraq conducted its program outside of the sites declared to 
the IAEA. At the time of the treaty making, drafters did not think that possibility of 
clandestine development would high and they thought that it would be found out 
because of the big size of nuclear-related facility. 
  Although some criticized the lack of IAEA capability to find out Iraqi 
clandestine program, the main problem is not that the IAEA did not work seriously 
but that the IAEA had no authority to find out clandestine activities. It comes from 
the IAEA safeguards ystem itself that the IAEA could not find out Iraqi 
clandestine program. 
  With the reveal of Iraqi clandestine development program, the limit of the IAEA 
safeguards system was widely recognized. Then in order for the IAEA to be able to 
find out clandestine nuclear development program, the IAEA started "the 93+2
4) On the activities of the UNSCOM, see Edward J. Lacey, "The UNSCOM Experience: Implications for 
   U.S. Arms Control Policy," Arms Control Today, Vol.26, No.6, August 1996, pp.9-14; Rolf Ekeus, 
   "Leaving Behind the UNSCOM Legacy in Iraq
," Arms Control Today, Vol.27, No.4, June/July 1997, 
   pp.3-6; Richard Butler, "Keeping Iraq's Disarmament in Track," Arms Control Today, Vol.26, No.6, 
   August/September 1998, pp.3-7; Richard Butler, "The Lessons and Legacy of UNSCOM," Arms 
   Control Today, Vol.29, No.4, June 1999, pp.3-9. 
5) IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153.
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program" in 1993. They have examined the ways to strengthen its safeguards by 
dividing the problem into two categories. Part 1 deals with the clarification of the 
activities that can be conducted under then current legal authority, which was 
adopted in 1995. Part 2 deals with the measures that need new authority for the 
IAEA to take, which was adopted in 1997. As the part 2 measures need new 
authority, the IAEA Council adopted a model protocol additional to safeguards 
agreement. 6)
  Main purpose of the model protocol is to rectify the system based on self-
declaration and secure the correctness and completeness of safeguards. It requires 
state members to provide more information and authorizes IAEA inspectors to have 
a wider access. Completeness means that there is no undeclared material or facility 
and all are under the IAEA safeguards. Correctness means that there is no 
discrepancy between the declaration by states and the conclusion by IAEA based on 
inspection. 
  The characteristic of traditional safeguards i  that it focuses on nuclear material 
and depends on qualitative analysis. Under a new safeguards ystem, the IAEA 
would analyze various information as a whole and qualitatively analyze each 
country's activities as a whole. Sites where inspectors can have an access are 
widely expanded and the new method of environmental monitoring can be used in 
order to detect clandestine nuclear activities. 
  b) Export Control by the Zangger Committee) (Article III.2 of the NPT) 
  According to Article III, paragraph 2, each state party undertakes not to provide: 
(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable 
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source 
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this
6) IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540. On the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards, ee David A. V. Fischer, 
   "New Directions and Tools for Strengthening IAEA Safeguards," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.3, 
   No.2, Winter 1996, pp.69-76: Mark H. Killinger, "Improving IAEA Safeguards through Enhanced 
   Information Analysis," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.3, No.1, Fall 1995, pp.43-48; Erwin Hackel 
   and Gotthard Stein (eds.), Tightening the Reins: Toward A Strengthened International Safeguards 
   System, Springer, Berlin, 2000. 
7) On the origin and activities of the Zangger Committee, see Fritz W. Schmidt, "The Zangger Committee: 
   Its History and Future Roles," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.2, No.1, 1994, pp.38-44; Fritz 
   Schmidt, "NPT Export Control and the Zangger Committee," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.7, 
   No.3, Fall-Winter 2000, pp. 136-145; Multilateral Nuclear Supply Principles of the Zangger Committee, 
  Working Paper submitted by Members of the Zangger Committee, NPT/CONF.2000/17, 18 April 2000.
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article. 
  This paragraph deals with the application of safeguards to the transfer from a 
state party to any non-nuclear-weapon state. All non-nuclear-weapon states eem 
to be affected by this paragraph. However, as non-nuclear-weapon state parties to 
the Treaty are under legal obligation to apply safeguards to all peaceful nuclear 
activities under Article III, paragraph 1, Article III, paragraph 2 shall apply only to 
non-nuclear-weapon states that are not party to the Treaty. 
  The paragraph stipulates a general principle only, lacking concrete standards or 
measures. In order to avoid discretional judgement by each state in the application 
of this paragraph, main exporter states tarted informal consultations in 1971. Main 
purpose was to have a common understanding what (a) source or special fissionable 
material and (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or processing mean, that is, to establish a common understanding on 
the interpretation and application of the Article III, paragraph 2. This consultation 
forum was called a Zangger Committee, named after its chairman. 
  The Committee reached an agreement in September 1972, but it was published 
formally in August 1974 because it took time to secure Soviet participation. It was 
agreed that definition of (a) would follow the one included in the Article XX of the 
IAEA Statute, and the items which should be included under (b) are listed in detail, 
such as nuclear reactors and equipment herefor, and non-nuclear materials for 
reactors. The list is called "Trigger List", because the transfer of these items should 
press the trigger of safeguards on them. The content of the trigger list has been 
revised eight times so far in order to adapt to scientific and technological 
development and to provide more concrete and precise description. 
  Current list contains plants, equipment and, as appropriate, material in the 
following categories: nuclear reactors, non-nuclear materials for reactors, 
reprocessing, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, heavy-water production, and 
conversion. 
  In addition, the Committee agreed as the condition for supply, (1) to specify to 
the recipient states that the source or special fissionable material shall not be 
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, (2) to satisfy that 
safeguards to that end will be applied to the source or special fissionable material in 
question, and (3) to require satisfactory assurances that the material will not be re-
exported unless arrangements are made for the acceptance of safeguards by the 
state receiving such re-export.8)
8) IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/209, 3 September 1974.
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  The Committee's agreements are all informal and they are not legally binding. 
The agreements are implemented by each member state through national egislation 
or practices. The Committee does not have any authority to criticize or stop an 
transfer or to inflict sanctions on any member state. Each member state informs 
other members on its actual export or the issue of export licenses annually. 
  It was agreed that the safeguards applied in the case of export were not full-
scope but item-specific safeguards which meant hat safeguards would applied only 
to nuclear material related to the item exported. While a non-nuclear-weapon state 
party to the Treaty has to accept full-scope safeguards, a non-nuclear-weapon state 
that is not a party to the NPT has to accept partial safeguards only in connection 
with imported nuclear-related facility or material even if its import comes from a 
party to the Treaty. Commercial interest was a main reason for the partial 
safeguards, and as a result, non-parties are in more advantageous position than 
parties in terms of burden. 
  Original members are Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Norway, Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1974, and a little later West 
Germany and Dutch joined. In 1990s, Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greek, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, Switzerland, Sweden joined, 
increasing the number of the member states to 22. China joined in 1998 and the 
number of current members is 35.
2. Measures Without A Prior Political Agreement 
  a) Export Control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)9) 
  India conducted its first nuclear test underground in 1974 using plutonium that 
was reprocessed from irradiated fuel in the research reactor provided by Canada. 
This event aroused concern among main nuclear suppliers about nuclear 
proliferation and they began consultation on the conditions of supply. Since April 
1975, in order to prevent he danger of nuclear proliferation, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, West Germany, Canada and Japan tried to 
accommodate their national policy on conditions for export of nuclear-related 
facility and material. Later, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland joined. In 1977, they agreed on the 
guidelines for export of nuclear material, equipment and technology (London
9) On the NSG, see The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origin, Role and Activities, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/ 
   539/Rev. 1(Corrected), 29 November 2000; Tadeusz Strulak, "The Nuclear Suppliers Group," The 
   Nonproliferation Review, Vol.1, No.1, Fall 1993, pp.2-10; Roland Timervaev, The Nuclear Suppliers 
   Group: Why and How It Was Created (1974-1978), PIR Center, Moscow, October 2000.
2002] NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL 9
Guidelines), which include following conditions as well as a trigger list. 
  (1) Formal governmental assurances should be obtained from recipients 
excluding uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device. 
  (2) All nuclear materials and facilities in the trigger listshould be placed under 
effective physical protection. 
  (3) Suppliershould transfer trigger items only when the safeguards apply. 
  (4) The above-mentioned three requirements should also apply to facilities for 
reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy-water production, utilizing technology directly 
transferred by the supplier or derived from transferred facilities, or major critical 
components hereof. 
  (5) Suppliers should exercise restraint in transfer of sensitive facilities, 
technology and weapon-usable materials. 
  (6) The recipient nation should agree that the transferred facility will not 
produce greater than 20% enriched uranium. 
  (7) Suppliers recognize the importance of including in agreements on supply of 
nuclear materials or of facilities which produce weapon-usable material, provisions 
calling for mutual agreement between the supplier and the recipient on 
arrangements for reprocessing, storage, alteration, use, transfer or retransfer of any 
weapon-usable material involved. 
  (8) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items only upon the recipient's 
assurance that in the case of retransfer the recipient of the retransfer will provide 
the same assurance. 
  The agreement is the guidelines that each member should apply as a minimum 
standard in its national nuclear export policy. The guidelines do not legally bind 
the members and they are implemented through national legislation or practices. 
The content of the trigger list is substantially the same as the Zangger Committee, 
and the level of application of safeguards i also the same. 
  However, there is a big difference between the two systems. While the 
guidelines by the Zangger Committee apply to the export to a non-nuclear-weapon 
state that is not a party to the Treaty, the guidelines by the NSG, which were agreed 
outside of the NPT framework, apply to the export to all non-nuclear-weapon 
states, whether it is a party to the NPT or not. 
  Accordingly, the condition of the application of safeguards by the NSG makes 
no difference to non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the Treaty because they have 
already accepted full-scope safeguards. However, the guidelines concerning 
restraint in transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, 
and mutual agreement on arrangement for reprocessing, storage, alteration, use,
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transfer or retransfer of any weapon-usable material apply to non-nuclear-weapon 
states even if they are parties to the NPT. 
  After the Gulf War in 1991, the UNSCOM and the IAEA conducted on-site 
inspections in Iraqi territory and found out that Iraq had been developing nuclear 
weapon program. Then it was generally recognized that the export control system 
was not enough to prevent a country from developing nuclear weapon program. As 
a result, the NSG members met in 1991 and 1992 and agreed as a new condition for 
export that when members export nuclear-related facility or material, they have to 
apply IAEA safeguards on all recipient nuclear activities, that is, full-scope 
safeguards. 
  In addition, as Iraqi nuclear weapon development had heavily depended on 
import of dual-use items from developed countries, it was recognized that not only 
directly nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, but also nuclear-
related dual-use equipment, material and related technology must be regulated. 
Members agreed on guidelines of nuclear-related dual-use items. 10) 
  Items identified in the Annex are industrial equipment, material, uranium 
isotope separation equipment and components, heavy water production plant related 
equipment, implosion system development equipment, explosives and related 
equipment, nuclear testing equipment and components and others. Suppliers should 
establish export-licensing procedures for the transfer of equipment, material, and 
related technology identified in the Annex. In considering whether to authorize 
such transfers, suppliers should exercise prudence and take relevant factors into 
account. As conditions for transfer, supplier should obtain (a) a statement from the 
end-user specifying the uses and end-use locations of the proposed transfer; and (b) 
an assurance xplicitly stating that the proposed transfer of any replica thereof will 
not be used in any nuclear explosive activities or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle 
activity. 
  When a stare denies a transfer, the state should inform the denial to all other 
members. They also agreed on 'no-undercut' policy, that is, when a state denies a 
transfer, other members can't authorize the transfer of the same items without 
consultation with the state. 
  In 1994, so-called non-proliferation principle was agreed. A member state can 
authorize the transfer only when it is satisfied that the transfer would not contribute 
to proliferation of nuclear weapons, even if condition under the guideline is 
fulfilled. A transfer may be denied when the transfer may include the danger of
10) IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/154/Part.2, May 1992.
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proliferation, even if a recipient is a party to the NPT or a treaty 
nuclear-weapon-free zone.
establishing a
III. Challenges of Nuclear-related Export Control
  The issue of nuclear-related export control has been challenged from various 
aspects, and we can divide these into two big challenges. One of the challenges is 
from its effectiveness. Export control is necessary and desirable from the 
viewpoint of non-proliferation, but it is not sufficient because it lacks effectiveness. 
Measures to strengthen its effectiveness have to be taken. The other is the 
challenge from its legitimacy. Export control is not desirable because its policy has 
been taken unilaterally by some developed nations and the measures prevent 
underdeveloped nations from developing their peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
These two challenges come from opposite directions. The fact that these 
diametrically different arguments have been raised means the issue of export 
control is very complicated and serious. 11)
1. Challenge from Effectiveness 
  The current systems of export control are based on the informal agreement 
among thirty to forty states. The first challenge comes from its informality. 
Guidelines have been adopted by consensus, but the agreement is informal, having 
no legally binding force, and not a rule of international law. The guidelines have 
been implemented through national egislation or practices. The group of exporting 
countries as a whole never tries to judge each transfer. There is no authoritative or 
uniform mechanism to judge the implementation of the guidelines. From these 
aspects, effectiveness of the export control has been criticized. For example, in 
spite of Russian statement that its transfer of low enriched uranium to India would 
not violate the NSG guidelines, many members have interpreted Russia's transfer
11) Bech, after analyzing not only nuclear-related but also whole multilateral export control regime and 
  indicating it is facing various challenges, concludes by arguing (1) the United States must develop 
   greater domestic onsensus on realistic objectives for export policies by engaging industry, government, 
   and academic leaders in a dialogue, (2) efforts in the short term should concentrate on "deepening" the 
   regimes by formalizing and strengthening regime provisions before moving to expand regime 
   membership toaccommodate n w membership, (3) governments must incest more in using technology 
  to monitor technology transfers and use by recipients, and (4) member states should begin thinking 
  about the possibility of moving away from denial-based regimes to verification regime for some dual-
  use technologies. (Michael Beck, "Reforming the Multilateral Export Control Regimes," The 
   Nonproliferation Review, Vol.7, No.2, Summer 2000, pp.91-103.)
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as contrary to the guidelines. 12) 
  Under these systems, judgement of violation by individual member state is 
possible, and each state may claim to other members that its transfer is contrary to 
the guidelines. However, there is no institution to judge each transfer publicly and 
authoritatively. Accordingly, it is claimed that these systems lack effectiveness 
because there is no way of taking countermeasures against violation. 
  Secondly, the effectiveness of the guidelines has been doubted because the 
contents of the guidelines are not clear enough. While the concrete trigger items 
are clear, a general principle such as non-proliferation principle has a tendency to 
be subordinated tosubjective interpretation of each member. 
  Thirdly, it is claimed that the effectivenessof the export control has been 
decreased as the number of the members has increased with various kinds of states 
joining. As there is a big difference of perception on the threat of proliferation 
among member states, it is natural that there is a big difference on the application of 
the guidelines among members. For example, the threat perception on Iran is quite 
different between the United State and Russia. 
  Fourthly, although the export control systems aim at avoiding commercial 
competition by giving higher priority to non-proliferation, in the real application of 
guidelines, commercial interest may have a priority. As a result, states that apply 
the guidelines more loosely would get more commercial benefit. 
  These challenges from the effectiveness of the systems mean that it is difficult 
to secure uniform implementation of the systems among thirty to forty members. 
From this fact, it is pointed that a more strict export control system only among the 
states with same threat perception like the COCOM system during the Cold War is 
better. For example, final report of Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export 
Controls For US National Security13), which was established under the direction of 
the 106th Congress, recommends to establish a new supplemental framework based 
on harmonized export control policies and enhanced efense cooperation with close 
allies and friends, as well as to merge the existing multilateral regimes into a single, 
maximally effective body. 
  On the contrary,the current export control systems with thirty to forty members 
do not include China, India, North Korea and others that are active in exporting 
nuclear-related equipment, material or technology. It is necessary to include these 
counties into the regime for the regime to be effective.
12) "Russia Ships Nuclear Fuel to India," Arms Control Today, Vol.3 1, No.2, March 2001, p.32. 
13) Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Control For US National Security, Final Report, April 
   24, 2001. http://www.stimson.org/tech/sgemec/index.html
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  When a state is denied the transfer of regulated items, there is a tendency that 
the state tries to work hard to produce them indigenously. The possession of the 
item would be delayed by the application of export control, but it does not 
necessarily prevent the state from acquiring the items in the end. The effectiveness 
of the system will not be maintained. 
  In order to secure the effectiveness of the export control systems, two 
completely different arguments have been submitted. On the one hand, some argue 
for the strict regulation and implementation of the regime even if the number of 
members decreases. On the other hand, others argue for wider participation in the 
regime rather than the stricter regulation. Some argue for deepening the regime 
while others argue for widening the regime. It is impossible to accomplish both 
deepening and widening simultaneously, and the point is which should have a 
priority.
2. Challenge from Legitimacy 
  The current export control systems were agreed only among exporting countries 
including highly industrialized states, and have been applied unilaterally by these 
states. From the point of view of underdeveloped states, the systems have been 
lacking legitimacy because they are decided and applied unilaterally without any 
consultation with the underdeveloped states. 
  The working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned 
Countries at the 2000 NPT Review Conference includes following statements. 14) 
  -The states parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty 
unilaterally enforced restrictive measures that prevent peaceful nuclear 
development should be removed. 
  -The states parties note with concern that undue restrictions on export to 
developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes 
persist. They emphasize that proliferation concerns are best addressed through 
multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory 
agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and 
open to participation by all states, and should ensure that they do not impose 
restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes 
required by developing countries for their continued development. 
  These arguments from the viewpoint of legitimacy are based on the right of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right to participate in the fullest possible
14) NPT/CONF.2000/18, 24 April 2000.
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exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information 
stipulated in Article IV of the NPT. It further provides that parties shall cooperate 
in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states, with 
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 
  Assistance in developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the 
measures to mitigate the discriminatory nature of the NPT. This was thought o be 
one of the means to motivate non-nuclear-weapon states to participate in the NPT. 
Article IV was included for this purpose. 
  However, the assistance in nuclear activities or exchange of nuclear items has 
been mainly practiced not based on whether ecipients are parties to the NPT or not, 
but based on commercial interests. The export control system by the NSG was 
made up and practiced without taking any account whether ecipients are parties to 
the NPT or not. On the contrary, the guidelines of the Zangger Committee concern 
with the interpretation and application of Article III, paragraph 2, and apply to the 
transfer to non-nuclear-weapon states that are not parties to the NPT. 
  The NSG was established and its guidelines have been applied outside of the 
NPT framework. At the beginning the NSG was established outside of the NPT in 
order to include states that have no intention to accede the NPT such as France, but 
now all members of the NSG are parties to the NPT. 
  The first and the most important challenge from legitimacy is that a state that is 
a member of the NPT and accepts the legal obligation of non-proliferation istreated 
just the same as a non-party, and sometimes the party is given less favorable 
treatment than a non-party. The parties accept full-scope safeguards under Article 
III, paragraph 1, and the measures beyond it are thought to be contrary to the 
principle of legitimacy. 
  "The Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and 
Disarmament that was adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference includes in paragraph 16 the statement that in all activities designed to 
promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given 
to the non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, taking the need of developing 
countries particularly into account. 
  The second challengeis that the export control has been applied by industrial 
states unilaterally. From the point of view of developing non-nuclear-weapon 
states, the export control measures conducted by industrial states are unilaterally 
applied restrictive measures and as a result an unfair barrier to their peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. Generally speaking, it is the issue of participation in decision-
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makings. They are criticizing the regime by stating that with no-participation i  the 
elaboration of the guidelines export of nuclear-related items to them is rejected 
through the application of the guidelines. 
  The third challenge is that the multilateral export control regime lacks 
transparency. Consultations within the NSG are all confidential and the factual 
status of export control is not open to public although the guidelines were published 
as IAEA documents. "The Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament" of 1995 provides in paragraph 17 that transparency in nuclear-
related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and 
cooperation among all interested states party to the Treaty. 15) 
  In order to increase transparency of the regime, the members of the NSG are 
making efforts to explain the purposes and contents of the export control regime to 
non-members individually or through holding seminars collectively. 
  The fourth challenge comes from the fact that afterthe end of the Cold War the 
NSG guidelines include dual-use nuclear-related items in addition to exclusively 
nuclear-related items. Dual-use nuclear-related items can be used for non-nuclear 
peaceful purposes. Restriction on export of dual-use items increases the area of 
non-transfer to developing countries even if it would be used for non-nuclear 
purposes.
3. Harmonization of Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
  Harmonization of effectiveness andlegitimacy is very difficult, because as stated 
above the direction of the two is completely opposite. However, in order to make 
the export control system work smoothly, it is indispensable to find the ways to 
harmonize the challenges from effectiveness and legitimacy. 
  In the 1970s when the Zangger Committee and the NSG were established, many 
states remained outside of the NPT. For example, France was not a party to the 
NPT until 1991. Both in providers and recipients of nuclear-related items, there 
were many non-parties to the Treaty. However, today only four states, that is, 
India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba still remain outside of the NPT, and universality of 
the Treaty is secured widely. This is a very important development and the export 
control regime should take this reality into account. 
  The Zangger Committee that was established to deal with the common
15) At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, export control was one of the sharply contentious issues. As a 
  result in the final document, the paragraph that the NSG is playing a role in this field was deleted and 
   the paragraph dealing with the Zangger Committee was also deleted. It means how serious the 
   dissatisfaction of developing countries is.
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interpretation and application of Article III, paragraph 2, has an informal status 
since its beginning and agreed guidelines are also informal in nature. From the 
viewpoint of commercial competition, the guidelines of the Committee do not 
require to apply full-scope safeguards as a condition of transfer. In spite of the fact 
that the Committee has the purpose of common interpretation and application of the 
Article of the Treaty, the guidelines are agreement among thirty to forty states only, 
not among all states party to the Treaty. 
  A state that is a party to the Treaty but is not a member of the Zangger 
Committee is not bound by the Committee's guidelines and can behave freely. 
  It is highly recommended that a review conference of the NPT should begin 
discussion on the Zangger Committee with the participation of all parties and agree 
to apply a strict export control system that would be applied only to transfer to non-
parties to the NPT. Within this framework, a new regime that is responsible to the 
challenges from effectiveness and legitimacy will be possible. The scope of current 
guidelines of the Committee covers only exclusively nuclear-related items. It could 
keep its current scope or may expand to include dual-use nuclear-related items. 
What is absolutely needed is the introduction of the application of full-scope 
safeguards. 
  The NSG that was established independently from the NPT should strengthen its 
connection with the NPT, now that all members of the NSG are parties to the 
Treaty. Indeed, states such as Iraq and North Korea have exploited their 
membership in the NPT to develop nuclear weapons clandestinely. But this fact 
should not be used to generalize their cases and being a party to the Treaty should 
not be ignored when transfer is considered. The practice that restricts or denies the 
transfer of nuclear-related items even if the recipient is a party to the Treaty is an 
overreaction. 
  In particular, when an exporter state has to decide whether to authorize or deny 
its transfer, the fundamental criteria should be whether a recipient is a party to the 
NPT or not. The issue of treaty violation such as Iraqi or North Korean case is the 
issue of the compliance with treaty obligations and should be responded or rectified 
by strengthening its verification mechanism. For example, the IAEA adopted a 
model additional protocol to safeguards agreement that introduced more robust 
verification mechanism. It is reasonable to apply stricter export control or export 
denial to non-parties to the NPT because they have not accepted the obligation of 
non-proliferation. 
  To parties to the Treaty, it is reasonable not to apply export restriction or denial 
but to generally authorize transfer while establishing a regime to keep monitoring
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transferred items or technology. A regime should be elaborated that in general 
permits the transfer and strengthens the procedure to secure the transferred items 
never be used in developing nuclear weapons. Recipient states should accept wider 
verification measures including frequent and wider on-site inspections in order to 
make their intention clearer. 
  Finally, the relationship between the NSG and the NPT should be strengthened. 
Transparency of the NSG should be promoted and universality of the NSG should 
be secured. With these measures, we should proceed to mitigate the discriminatory 
aspect of the NSG.
IV. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
  Every issue concerning nuclear non-proliferation including proliferation of 
nuclear-related materials and technologies relates to the issue of nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The fundamental point is whether to take 
non-proliferation is a goal itself and take various measures for non-proliferation or 
to take non-proliferation as a means for nuclear disarmament, ot as a goal itself. 
  Analyzing from the viewpoint of maintaining international peace and security, 
and from a long-term viewpoint, nuclear elimination is a final goal. This position 
does not contradict with the proposition that it is impossible to accomplish nuclear 
elimination i  short ime. Nor this position contradicts with the proposition that 
nuclear elimination is not feasible in current structure ofinternational society. 
  Eliminating nuclear weapons would take long and may need the restructuring of 
international society. However, these do not mean that non-proliferation s a final 
goal and international society as a whole make effort only for nuclear non-
proliferation. Nuclear non-proliferation s absolutely necessary as a precondition f 
nuclear elimination because nuclear proliferation would make the goal of nuclear 
elimination more difficult. 
  The NPT wassigned in 1968 and privileged status was given to the five nuclear-
weapon states. It was thought necessary togive such a status in order to prevent the 
situation from going much worse, and perpetuation f the privileged status was not 
thought to be a final goal. According to a preambular paragraph, the Treaty was 
agreed by considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a 
nuclear war and the consequent eed to make every efforts to avert he danger of 
such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples. It also 
declares their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
18 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 49: 1
disarmament. Under Article VI of the Treaty, parties undertake to pursue 
negotiations on such measures. 
  Taking nuclear non-proliferation regime as a goal itself promotes its 
discriminatory nature. Export control system is sometimes seen as a concrete 
measure of its discrimination. This is the fundamental problem of export control 
system. 
  Export control system that is one measure of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime is indispensable to accomplish a goal of non-proliferation, but proliferation 
of nuclear-related technology is very difficult to prevent in the era of global 
economy, and export control has been criticized from the viewpoint of legitimacy. 
As technical measures for nuclear non-proliferation have their limit in application, 
political measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons should be taken. 
Demand-side approach rather than supply-side approach should be emphasized. 
  It is necessary to improve national security and regional security, and decrease 
the political and military role or value of nuclear weapons.
